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INTRODUCTION
Since the burgeoning of the private prison industry in the 1980s,
the practice of contracting correctional services to private companies
has received sharp criticism for incentivizing corporate advocacy of
harsher crime policy and ensuring cost minimization at the expense
of the prisoners’ safety and capacity for rehabilitation. Many schol-
ars have recoiled at the practice of privatizing the government’s
capacity to restrict the liberty of its citizens.  Yet in the literature’s1
response to the wave of prison privatization that has characterized
recent decades, these scholars have failed to offer substantive solu-
tions beyond simply abolishing the practice. While discussing the
premise of his recent book, That Used to Be Us,  Thomas Friedman2
observed that the incentives of contemporary politics are misaligned
with the will of the people and eloquently captured the need for
reform: “Move the cheese; move the mouse. Don’t move the cheese;
mouse doesn’t move.”  This blunt but sage observation reflects the3
economic axiom that “people respond to incentives”  that policy ana-4
lysts and scholars of all hats too often overlook.  In the extensive5
literature on prison privatization, critics clearly recognize the per-
verse incentive structures the private prison industry creates but
nevertheless fail to move the cheese,  instead proposing simply to6
kill the mouse.  This Note serves as an attempt to begin filling this7
gap in the literature by establishing a theoretical and practical
1. See, e.g., Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy
Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 113 (2009).
2. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW AMERICA
FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK (2011).
3. Thomas Friedman on ‘How America Fell Behind,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 6, 2011,
4:43 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/06/140214150/thomas-friedman-on-how-america-fell-
behind. 
4. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3
(1995) (“Most of economics can be summarized in four words: ‘People respond to incentives.’
The rest is commentary.”).
5. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND
MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS, at xi-xiii (2004) (relating the missteps of development
economics to the failure to recognize the keystone economic truism that individuals respond
to the incentives they face).
6. See infra Parts II, IV.
7. See Anderson, supra note 1. 
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framework for restructuring the private prison market and the
incentives corrections companies face. 
Proponents of the abolition of privatization,  in their haste to8
oppose the practice, ignore the reality that the private sector, when
confronted with the right incentives in a properly conceived market,
has the unique potential to improve the rehabilitative capacity of
the corrections system. Currently, the language of prison contracts
defines the service provided as the provision of prison beds.  The9
concomitant incentive structure created promotes a focus on cost
minimization of this service and serves as the foundation of the
seemingly unavoidable challenges posed by prison privatization.
The private prison market and the service provided by prison com-
panies, however, need not be structured in such narrow terms. In
order to reformulate the market and in turn the incentives created,
contracting agencies should use performance-based measurements
—such as comparative recidivism and employment rates—that
would begin to redefine the market as that for rehabilitated pris-
oners and reformulate the operational philosophy of prison corpor-
ations. Although the contours of this system would initially be
difficult to define, the ultimate impact of incentivizing cost-efficient
rehabilitation and capturing the innovative capacity of the free
market to respond to the nation’s prison crisis would prove invalu-
able. 
Part I of this Note begins by providing context to the prison
privatization debate. Parts II and III respectively continue by
grouping the extensive criticism of prison privatization into two
categorical deficiencies—the emphasis on cost minimization over
quality improvements and the encroachment of the profit motive
into sentencing policy and practice. Treating these topics in turn,
this Note highlights the utility of reconceptualizing the private
market as that for the rehabilitation of inmates rather than simply
the provision of prison beds. In order to effect this paradigm shift,
Part IV proposes the utilization of a graduated bonus system that
evaluates recidivism and employment rates in order to incentivize
innovative methods of preparing inmates to return to society. 
8. See id.
9. Although contracts often include an ancillary requirement of the provision of certain
services, the underlying market is nevertheless for prison beds. 
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I. PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Getting Tough on Crime: Determinate Sentencing and the
Prison Bubble
Beginning most prominently with Richard Nixon in his 1968
presidential campaign, political candidates across the nation have
used crime as a campaign platform, promising tougher measures for
fighting crime.  The emergence of crime as a political tool accom-10
panied a shift in the operational philosophy of corrections from
rehabilitation to incapacitation.  This resulted in a wave of deter-11
minate sentencing legislation that mandated longer sentences for
offenders.  The increase in sentence lengths in turn led to an in-12
crease in the prison population. By 1986, thirty-eight states were
either full or above capacity, and seven states exceeded capacity by
more than 50 percent.  Courts subsequently began ordering states13
to reduce overcrowding,  further augmenting the dramatic increase14
in demand for prison beds. In view of this sharp increase in demand,
private firms with experience managing detainment facilities began
10. Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
9, 13-14 (1999).
11. See Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison
Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 12 (2003) (“The main
justification for the recent ‘three strikes’ laws and other ‘tough on crime’ legislation is
incapacitation. The theory of incapacitation relies on the assumption that if you take
criminals off the street for a longer period of time, the crimes he or she would have committed
in that time period will be prevented and the crime rate will drop.”).
12. See id.
13. See Douglas C. McDonald & Carl W. Patten, Growth and Development of the Private
Prisons Industry, in SCOTT D. CAMP & GERALD G. GAES, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS OFFICE OF
RESEARCH & EVALUATION, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES, app. at 93, 99 (2000).
14. See JOSEPH I. HALLINAN, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 97 (2001)
(describing how a court in Alabama ordered jails to provide inmates with a living space of no
less than sixty feet); Christine Bowditch & Ronald S. Everett, Private Prisons: Problems
Within the Solution, 4 JUST. Q. 441, 442 (1987) (stating that by 1985, correctional institutions
in thirty-three states were under court order to reduce overcrowding); Sharon Dolovich, State
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 455-56 (2005) (“Eventually, the courts
began issuing orders requiring government officials to relieve the overcrowding, and it became
apparent that more prisons had to be built.”(footnote omitted)). This problem, moreover, has
not gone away. The Supreme Court recently upheld a district court order directing California
to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. See
Brown v. Plata, 131 U.S. 1910, 1943-47 (2011).
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to perceive the potential profitability of providing prison services.15
The Corrections Corporation of America, a Nashville-based firm,
was the first to enter the market in 1985  and other companies soon16
followed.17
State governments found private prisons attractive primarily
because of the reduced cost of operations, faster build times, and
politically expedient financing.  Due to budget, capital, and labor18
constraints in the public sector, the private sector can build prisons
faster and operate them at a lower cost than government prisons.19
The Corrections Corporation of America, for example, can build a
prison in nine months and have it operational within twelve,
whereas a similar government facility would require a three-year
window.  From a management perspective, private prisons boast20
the benefit of reduced costs, primarily derived from the use of non-
union labor.  Because labor represents two-thirds of the operating21
cost of prisons, private prisons achieve significant savings by
15. For the two largest private prison companies, the Corrections Corporation of America
and Wackenhut, Inc., now the GEO Group, immigrant detainment served as a springboard
to entry into the private prison market. See McDonald & Patten, supra note 13, at 95-96. 
16. See id. at 96.
17. This was not the first time, however, that profit motive entered into the realm of
corrections. After the Civil War, the enforcement of the black codes led to overcrowding and
the private sector seized on a perceived opportunity for cheap labor. Adults and children were
leased and subleased to coal mines, railroad companies, sawmills, and other businesses of the
industrializing South. See SI KAHN & ELIZABETH MINNICH, THE FOX IN THE HENHOUSE: HOW
PRIVATIZATION THREATENS DEMOCRACY 75-76 (2005); Dolovich, supra note 14, at 450-53. In
addition, between 1850 and 1950, Michigan, California, Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma util-
ized private prisons to house state prisoners. See BYRON EUGENE PRICE, MERCHANDIZING
PRISONERS: WHO REALLY PAYS FOR PRISON PRIVATIZATION? 5 (2006). 
18. See Dolovich, supra note 14, at 457 (“The help offered took two forms. First, the
private sector offered to assist states with the capital financing of prison construction ....
Second, private firms offered to take over the day-to-day management of entire penal
facilities, pledging to run the prisons at a lower cost than the state would otherwise pay.”). 
19. See RICHARD A. MCGOWAN, PRIVATIZE THIS?: ASSESSING THE OPPORTUNITIES AND
COSTS OF PRIVATIZATION 158 (2011).
20. John Howard, Private Prison Company Finds Gold in California, CAPITOL WKLY. (Jan.
28, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=yl82yoctf9d1au.
21. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at
15, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-industrial-
complex/4669z/.
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avoiding the wage premium imposed by prison guard unions on
public prisons.  22
In addition to the speed and reduced cost of private prison oper-
ations, many governments facing debt restrictions were attracted to
the lease-payment bond mode of financing, which allowed legislators
to circumvent public scrutiny and disapproval of increased expendi-
ture on prisons by incorporating the financing of new prisons into
the operating budget rather than the capital improvements bud-
get.  Private companies would issue bonds to fund the construction23
of new prisons and then lease the bonds to the state, which in turn
paid for the bonds through its operating budget.  Although the24
taxpayer remains liable for the cost in this scenario, policymakers
evade the political fallout of raising taxes for the express purpose of
funding prison construction. 
B. Market Concentration
As a result of the confluence of interests supporting prison
privatization, the private prison industry grew swiftly from its in-
fancy in the 1990s. In 1990, there were 44 private prisons in the
United States housing approximately 15,000 inmates.  By 2000,25
there were 264 private prisons, representing 16 percent of all prison
facilities,  and, by 2005, the number of private facilities increased26
to 415, or 23 percent of all penal institutions.  Of these facilities,27
approximately two-thirds were under contract with state govern-
ments and one-third were under contract with the Federal Bureau
22. Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Proper Scope of Government:
Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1147 (1997) (“Private prisons are
perhaps 10 percent cheaper, per prisoner, than public prisons. The major reason for the lower
costs appears to be the roughly 15 percent wage premium for public guards over private
guards.”(footnote omitted)). 
23. See MICHAEL A. HALLET, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 67 (2006); Anderson, supra note
1, at 115 (“Private prison contracts are intended to alleviate prison overcrowding and reduce
corrections expenditures while bypassing the need for bonds, increased taxes, or funding
referenda.”).
24. McDonald & Patten, supra note 13, at 110.
25. Id. at 96. 
26. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
csfcf05.pdf.
27. Id. 
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of Prisons.  In 2009, nearly half of all new inmates were sent to28
private prisons, and private prison beds constituted almost 9 per-
cent of the market.  The market is even further concentrated in29
particular states, as the proportion of prisoners held in private
facilities varies widely from state to state. In 2006, nine states
held 20 percent or more of their prisoners in private prisons.30
Conversely, nineteen states did not utilize private prison facilities
at all.  31
C. Looking Forward in the Industry
Although the private prison industry experienced steady growth
into the twenty-first century, many states and policymakers facing
increasingly severe budget constraints are beginning to look for
ways to minimize the costs of incarceration in the wake of the recent
economic downturn.  Some states are once again starting to recog-32
nize the cost-savings potential of rehabilitative corrections and
indeterminate sentencing.  Along with and in part because of this33
trend, the state prison population declined in 2009 for the first time
in over a decade.  Yet as the Corrections Corporation of America34
and the GEO Group both acknowledge, and as independent market
analysis suggests, the decline of determinate sentencing measures
and the concomitant shrinking of the prison population represent
28. Id.
29. Kopin Tan, Private Prison Companies Have a Lock on the Business, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
25, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125641692049506073.html. 
30. These nine states were, in descending order of percentage, New Mexico (43 percent),
Wyoming (38 percent), Hawaii (30 percent), Montana (27 percent), Alaska (26 percent), Idaho
(25 percent), Oklahoma (25 percent), Mississippi (23 percent), and Vermont (22 percent). See
WILLIAM J. SABOL, TODD D. MINTON & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 4, 16 (2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/pjim06.pdf.
31. See id. at 16.
32. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE
MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 238 (2011) (“The Great Recession of 2008 has put severe pressure
on the ‘prison bubble’—if that is a fair term—as many states find themselves challenged to
service the debt associated with prison building or carry the expenses associated with massive
prison populations.”).
33. See Editorial, Prisons and Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A20.
34. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR
FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS 1 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedfiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/prison_count_2010.pdf. 
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the greatest threat to the viability of the private prison industry.35
Therefore, as the pendulum swings back to a more cost-effective use
of indeterminate sentencing and focus on rehabilitation, private
prison companies will have to adapt to changing market conditions.
The private sector, however, has the unique capacity not only to
adapt to the changing market but also to thrive by facilitating the
effective and innovative implementation of a rehabilitative correc-
tions framework.  In harnessing this capacity through the contrac-36
tual mechanism outlined below, contracting agencies can address
the fundamental deficiencies that have raised grave concerns about
the desirability of contracting for prison services. With these con-
cerns assuaged, private prison companies will face less opposition
to their services, breathing life into their potential role in the
changing marketplace. 
II. REBALANCING COST SAVINGS AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS
Accompanying the prison privatization movement has been a
consistent stream of opposition to privatizing the fundamental gov-
ernment function of punishing criminals. As testament to the
controversial nature of prison privatization, Illinois and New York
went so far as to ban the practice entirely,  and many states that37
allow privatization place stringent restrictions on the practice.  The38
most resounding critiques of prison privatization invariably relate
either to the positivist concern about the increased weight placed on
cost effectiveness over quality improvements  or to the normatively39
problematic encroachment of the profit motive into the public do-
main of corrections policy.  Beginning with the cost-minimization40
dilemma, this Note responds to each of these criticisms in turn by
35. Tan, supra note 29 (“Any reform that shortens sentences will hurt private prisons.”). 
36. See infra Part IV.
37. Illinois Private Correctional Facility Moratorium Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/3
(West 2012); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2012). 
38. Pam Belluck, As More Prisons Go Private, States Seek Tougher Controls, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 15, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/15/us/as-more-prisons-go-private-states-
seek-tighter-controls.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
39. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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suggesting the need to reformulate the performance incentives
created by the contracting process.
A. Cost Minimization and the Current Incentive Structure
In evaluating the impact of privatizing a particular government
service, one must consider the disparate incentives facing private
and public providers. Advocates of privatization invariably point to
the relative incapacity of public providers to innovate. Public
employees simply do not have the incentive to improve their service
provision because they see only a fraction of the return on their cost
reductions or quality improvements.  Private contractors, con-41
versely, have the capacity to capitalize on these improvements and
therefore serve as desirable agents of innovation for contracting
agencies. With respect to cost savings, the ability of a contractor to
profit from improved practices is relatively clear—the contract is
awarded, and any savings below the contract price represent
profit.  With quality improvements, however, the connection to42
profit becomes far more tenuous. In theory, “[b]ecause private prison
companies can suggest such innovations to the government and
renegotiate their contracts ... they can capture some of the gains
from quality innovation.”  Though this quality improvement capac-43
ity appears sound in theory, the practical tension between cost
reductions and quality improvements diminishes the potential
benefits of investing in quality improvements.  The private prison44
industry illustrates this tension well.
As many have observed, private ownership leads to an increased
emphasis on cost savings over quality improvements when provid-
ing prison services.  This outcome seems relatively intuitive when45
41. See Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1129.
42. See id.
43. See A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1878 (2002) [hereinafter A Tale of Two Systems].
44. See Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1129, 1139, 1141.
45. See, e.g., id. at 1141 (“Private ownership leads to an excessively strong incentive to
engage in cost reduction ... and to moderate—although still too weak—incentives to engage
in quality improvement.”); see also Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of
Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public Versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549, 554
(2005) (“A for-profit prison operator ... has almost no contractual incentive to provide
rehabilitation opportunities or educational or vocational training that might benefit inmates
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one considers that the contractor must, ex ante, negotiate for a
higher price if he endeavors to improve quality.  Under the cur-46
rently predominant method of contracting, the state pays private
prison companies a per diem rate for each prisoner and the contrac-
tor assumes the costs of maintaining the prison.  Any potential47
profits are thus made by performing the contracted function at a
lower cost than the contract price. As a result, private prisons are
incentivized to reduce costs by spending less on inmate services or
cutting the cost of labor.  In practice, private prisons have earned48
their slim profit margins  predominantly by spending less on prison49
labor.  Unfortunately, these cost reductions are not independent of50
the potential for quality improvements but rather represent com-
peting considerations.51
B. Criticism
The private sector’s shift of the balance away from quality
improvements and toward cost reductions has formed the founda-
tion of much of the criticism directed at the private prison in-
dustry.  As one commentator bluntly states, “[T]he drive toward52
after release, except insofar as these services act to decrease the current cost of con-
finement.”). 
46. See Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1129. Certainly, when considering the choice between
potential profits from quality innovation and guaranteed profits from cost reduction, one can
readily understand why firms choose the latter. 
47. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 474.
48. Id. at 474-76.
49. See HALLINAN, supra note 14, at 177-78; Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law
and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1218 (2008) (“[T]he prison
industry is oligopolistic, not perfectly competitive, so prison firms do make some profit. But
their profits are not high: 10% would be a generous estimate of prison firms’ profitability.”).
50. See Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates’ Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1498 n.158 (1986); see also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
51. See Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1152 (“There are significant opportunities for cost
reduction that do not violate the contracts, but that, at least in principle, can substantially
reduce quality.”). 
52. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 116 (“[P]rivate prison companies are primarily profit-
seeking entities, working to reduce costs wherever possible. Cost-cutting measures promote
inferior contract performance, undue safety risks, and poor delivery of inmate services. The
profit motive also encourages private prison companies to disregard the principles of inmate
rehabilitation and criminal deterrence; if advanced, these principles would undermine profits
and reduce the demand for these companies’ services.”(footnotes omitted)); Dolovich, supra
note 14, at 460-61 (“In practice, private prison providers have seemed little concerned with
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lowering costs ... engenders various other problems.... [P]rivate
prisons make money by cutting corners, which means skimping on
food, staffing, medicine, education, and other services for convicts.
It also means fielding poorly trained, ill-equipped, non-unionized
and often brutal guards.”  Indeed, the cost-minimizing efforts have53
led to more than just reductions in prisoner comfort. The emphasis
on cutting expenses has resulted in decreased levels of security and
a number of high-profile incidents of understaffing and abuse.  54
C. Insufficiency of Increased Input Measures
One response to many of the concerns outlined above has been ad-
vocacy of increased specification of inputs.  For example, some con-55
tracting agencies have required American Correctional Association
Accreditation,  while others have independently required the prison56
meeting this challenge. Instead, the anecdotal evidence suggests that contractors have
prioritized economy above all else, with disturbing results for the inmates themselves.”); see
also Low, supra note 11, at 7 (“For-profit organizations have a fiduciary duty to shareholders
to maximize profits, so they cannot spend money on improving prison conditions or improving
rehabilitation programs unless it will increase their profits. Government contracts provide
the almost exclusive source of revenue for private prisons, so these prisons are likely to
provide only the minimum contractual requirements, or perhaps slightly less than required
depending on the level of oversight and the impact on future bids.”(footnotes omitted)). 
53. See Christian Parenti, Privatized Problems: For-Profit Incarceration in Trouble, in
CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT: PRISON PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS 30, 36 (Andrew Coyle et al.
eds., 2003).
54. See Dolovich, supra note 14, at 461-62 (detailing the events at the Youngstown, Ohio
facility). Esmor is another prominent example. See id. at 498; see also John Sullivan &
Matthew Purdy, Parlaying the Detentions Business into Profit: A Prison Empire: How It Grew,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1995, at A1.
55. For a discussion of output and input measurement, see RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE
PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 67 (1997) (“‘Output’ emphasizes ends, the means being
flexible. ‘Input’ emphasizes means, the ends being by-products which are not exactly
unplanned but are certainly subject to redefinition and retrospective rationalization.”). For
example, a contract specifying outputs for a remedial literacy class for prisoners might require
that participants’ reading skills reach a certain level. By contrast, a contract specifying input
measures would describe the extent of services required, such as the minimum hours a
teacher must work. See id. at 68. Harding notes, “[h]owever, there is a point, relevant to
current contractual practices, where these two concepts meet and merge. This middle ground
could perhaps be characterized as a category of ‘output-driven inputs.’” Id. at 67.
56. See Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1149-51 (discussing the accreditation process and the
small percentage of accredited prisons).
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to offer vocational training or educational programs.  These efforts,57
however, address only the symptoms of the problem rather than its
root. Even when prison companies are required to maintain rehab-
ilitation programs, they still have a financial interest in ensuring
that the programs are operated at minimal cost and, more impor-
tantly, they have no stake in the success or failure of such pro-
grams.  Ultimately, no level of monitoring or contract specificity58
can entirely eliminate the cost-minimizing incentives grounded in
the practice of contracting for prison beds.  Although adminis-59
trative law requires increased contractual specificity in order to
ensure greater accountability,  no contract can articulate every60
detail of the contractor’s performance.  This phenomenon—deemed61
an “inevitable incompleteness” — obfuscates the intended purpose62
of attempts to control private prison inputs, including output-driven
inputs,  because the incentive for prison companies to minimize63
costs remains.
57. See, e.g., FLA. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABIITY, WHILE
DMS HAS IMPROVED MONITORING, IT NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN PRIVATE PRISON OVERSIGHT AND
CONTRACTS 6 (2008), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/08
71rpt.pdf (“Private prison vendors are required to provide academic [and] vocational ... inmate
programs, while also ensuring that between 10% and 30% of inmates enroll in these
programs.”).
58. See Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: A Violation of U.S. Domestic Law,
International Human Rights, and Good Sense, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2006, at 12, 14-15.
59. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 133 (“Increased costs aside, contractual noncompliance
cannot be completely remedied by aggressive governmental monitoring and oversight. Private
prison companies have an incentive and an ability to conceal information that reflects poorly
on their contract performance.”); Dolovich, supra note 14, at 478 (“Where the standard of
service to be provided can be specified in detail in advance, careful drafting can provide some
protection from abuses. But with respect to many key features of prison life that are crucial
from the humanity perspective—the use of force, health care provision, inmate classification,
discipline, and inmate safety, among others—it can be difficult to specify in advance precisely
how they are to be provided.”). 
60. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 668
(2000).
61. See id.; Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1150 (“Although contracts can address some
quality issues, in several important areas incompleteness is evident, and could in principle
compromise the quality of service delivered by a private contractor. The two crucial areas we
consider are use of force and quality of personnel. These areas have been the focus of much
of the criticisms of private prisons.”).
62. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 478.
63. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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D. Normative Concerns
Although the increased weight placed on cost minimization
clearly presents economic efficiency concerns, many critics have
looked beyond this efficiency analysis to the normative concerns
implicated by the privatization of corrections. In her prominent
scholarship on private prisons, Professor Sharon Dolovich rejects
altogether what she describes as the “comparative efficiency” frame-
work for evaluating prisons.  Dolovich argues that focusing on the64
relative efficiency of private prisons as compared to public prisons
obscures the reality that society is failing to meet its normative
obligations to those it incarcerates.  The shift toward prison pri-65
vatization, Dolovich posits, importantly reflects “a larger trend
toward viewing incarceration in economic terms and regarding
prison inmates as the economic units of a financial plan.”  By com-66
modifying those it incarcerates, “society becomes less likely to see
those it punishes as human beings and more likely to lose a sense
of the severity of the burdens punishment imposes.”  Given the67
severe encroachment of state power on the liberty of individuals
that characterizes incarceration, Dolovich maintains that the focus
on comparative efficiency becomes wholly misguided.  After dis-68
carding the comparative efficiency analysis of private prisons,
Dolovich calls for a shift in focus to the fundamental normative
concerns posed by the private provision of prison services.  69
64. See Dolovich, supra note 14, at 441 (“For the most part, debate on this issue has
focused on the relative efficiency of private prisons as compared to their publicly run
counterparts and has assumed that, if private contractors can run the prisons for less money
than the state without a drop in quality, then states should be willing to privatize.”); see also
id. at 444-45 (suggesting an alternative framework).
65. Id. at 442 (“The conversation as defined by comparative efficiency is thus framed to
sidestep, rather than directly engage, the fact that conditions in many prisons—public and
private alike—fall far short of satisfying society’s obligations to those it incarcerates.”).
66. Id. at 544.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 441.
69. Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128, 138 (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow eds., 2009) (“[I]f policy deliberation is to take account of the full range of moral issues
incarceration raises, we need a genuine commitment to supplementing the language of
efficiency with the language of moral obligation.”).
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The alternative framework Dolovich proposes is referred to as
“liberal legitimacy.”  Liberal legitimacy requires that our penal70
policies and practices be consistent with two basic principles—the
humanity principle and the parsimony principle.  The parsimony71
principle instructs that the length of time served fit the crime com-
mitted and proscribes excessive sentence lengths. The parsimony
principle directly relates to the discussion of the capacity of the
prison industry to influence sentencing policy.  The humanity prin-72
ciple, on the other hand, proscribes “gratuitously inhumane” pun-
ishments and directly relates to the cost-efficiency focus of private
prisons just described.  Dolovich argues that prisons should be73
evaluated not based on their ability to minimize costs—as this
invariably encourages inhumane punishment—but rather by their
adherence to the humanity principle.74
Through this proposed alternative analytical framework, Dolovich
raises undeniably important concerns that inform the discussion of
prison privatization. The pragmatism of her argument, however,
seems weaker than its theoretical foundation, as it does not include
a politically viable plan for putting her framework into practice.
Faced with constrained budgets, legislators will inexorably reject,
either tacitly or explicitly, a proposed strategy that does not outline
cost-savings potential.  Indeed, in the absence of a strong constitu-75
ency supporting increased expenditure on prison services, the lack
70. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 444-45.
71. Id. at 445.
72. See infra Part III.B. 
73. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 445.
74. See id. at 514 (“[T]here is a great benefit in shifting the focus of the private prison
debate from efficiency to the humanity of conditions of confinement. Doing so allows us to
transcend the inadequate baseline of current prison conditions and to consider how the
system as a whole, public prisons as well as private, might better measure up against society’s
obligations to those it incarcerates.”).
75. Dolovich seems to accept this reality but does not present a mechanism for directly
confronting it. See Dolovich, supra note 69, at 139 (“Whether or not a cost-benefit approach
could adequately consider the full set of normative issues incarceration implicates, the fact
is that policymakers contemplating the use of private prisons are little concerned with
addressing this set of issues, whether through cost-benefit analysis or otherwise. Instead, the
efficiency standard actually driving the debate is what can be thought of as cost
minimization—that is, how to run the prisons at the lowest possible price.... [E]ven if
theoretically an efficiency analysis could take adequate account of broader normative
concerns, in the case of private prisons there is no meaningful effort on the part of
policymakers to do so.”). 
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of a cost-savings argument will inexorably present an insurmount-
able barrier.  By discussing reforms to the prison privatization76
scheme in terms of what policymakers are morally obligated to do
instead of engaging policymakers in their own arena of economic
analysis, Dolovich implicitly concedes that the policies she advocates
are not themselves cost effective. In other words, by rejecting an
economic analysis of prison utility, Dolovich obscures the possibility
that cost-benefit analysis can and indeed should lead to a system
that ultimately embraces the humanity principle, without relying
exclusively on a normative justification. Accordingly, the liberal
legitimacy framework—as with many normative arguments in the
prison literature—ultimately falls flat due to its inability to achieve
broader reform. Therefore, pragmatic considerations demand an
alternative approach to addressing the concerns raised by an
adherence to the humanity principle. 
E. Restructuring the Market
Past blunders of the corrections system have made it abundantly
clear that the baseline standard of evaluation, cost effectiveness of
prison bed provision, has proven woefully inadequate.  This inad-77
equacy, however, should not tarnish the perceived utility of eco-
nomic analysis but rather serve as an impetus for restructuring the
precise mode of economic analysis. The current framework suffers
from an overly narrow consideration of the service provided in the
market. The provision of a bed is the most tangible good provided
but certainly not the most significant.  For better or worse, private78
prison corporations do not merely act as providers of beds but
rather serve as government agents functioning within the broader
76. See David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453,
1453 (2010) (“Prisoners are the ultimate ‘discrete and insular minorit[y]’; no other group in
American society is so completely disabled from defending its rights and interests.”).
77. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 442 (“[I]n its drive to assess the relative performance of
private prisons, comparative efficiency accepts the current state of public prison conditions
as an unproblematic baseline.”).
78. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE INFORMATION HANDBOOK 44 (2012), available
at http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/spg/SPG_aohandbook.pdf (listing inmates’ rights,
including but not limited to, proper bedding and nutritious meals).
2102 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:2087
framework of the justice system and structuring inmates’ behavior
until they reenter society. 
By conceptualizing the market as that for prison beds, pol-
icymakers mischaracterize the prisoner as a static entity, and
thereby overlook the broader impact the prison has on the inmate’s
preparedness to reenter society.  In order to properly consider the79
complexity of the private prison’s service either through a cost-
benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis, policymakers and contracting
agencies must incorporate the cost of recidivism and expand the
time frame of their analysis. When one considers the cost of crime80
and the capacity of prisons to shape inmates’ likelihood of recidi-
vating  through an expanded longitudinal cost-benefit analysis, the81
long-term benefit of investing in rehabilitative corrections becomes
clear. Likewise, the long-term cost of failing to do so dramatically
alters the conceptions of how best to achieve efficiency and makes
apparent the dangers of a myopic focus on cutting the immediate
costs of corrections.  82
Although some might conclude that this analysis obviates the
need for private prisons because the contractors’ short-term cost-
cutting function proves unsustainable, this need not be the case.83
The unique capacity of the private sector to innovate still proves
useful, but only after restructuring prison contracts and thereby
redefining the market.  Currently, quality improvements are ne-84
79. Indeed, the future costs imposed by recidivating inmates—both in the form of the cost
of crime and the cost of reincarceration—will ultimately outweigh the present costs of
incarceration and therefore merit proportionate consideration. 
80. See David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the
Pickpocket’s Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 296 (2002) (“Life in a crime-laden society is
restricted and costly. Considering all facets of the crime burden, including victim expenses,
deterrence and health losses, the cost of crime exceeds $1.7 trillion annually in the United
States.” (citing David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & ECON. 611
(1999))).
81. See generally Thomas Orsagh & Jong-Rong Chen, The Effect of Time Served on
Recidivism: An Interdisciplinary Theory, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 155, 157 (1988).
82. Some might argue that this is simply a reformulated argument for a return to a focus
on rehabilitation. Indeed, the need to refocus the penal system’s efforts on rehabilitation in
lieu of incapacitation is one likely takeaway of an adequate cost-benefit analysis.
83. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 133 (“Thus, given the overarching financial motivations
that impel the actions of private prison companies, the only way to avoid the problems
associated with corrections privatization is to prohibit prison administration contracts
absolutely.”).
84. See discussion of framework infra Part IV.
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glected by private prison companies faced with an absence of fi-
nancial incentives. As this Note addresses at greater length in Part
IV, states should turn to performance-based contracts that incen-
tivize quality improvements by rewarding positive output. Such a
shift will not only rebalance cost minimization and quality improve-
ments in private prisons but will also respond pragmatically to
critics’ concerns relating to the treatment of prisoners. Moreover,
this shift will also prove desirable for the private sector as it faces
the need to adapt to changing market conditions that threaten the
viability of the private prison market.85
     III. DEMYSTIFYING THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S INFLUENCE ON  
SENTENCING
The second fundamental concern raised by the privatization of
corrections is the prison industry’s capacity to influence sentencing
through lobbying and, more perversely, by actively facilitating pro-
longed sentences. This Part first considers the demonstrable impact
of the prison industry on sentence lengths and then argues that the
mere potential for such an influence is acutely problematic.
A. The Impact of Proincarceration Lobbying
Private prisons operate in a market fueled by the use of incarcera-
tion as punishment. In order to retain their small profit margins,86
prison companies must operate at full capacity.  As a result, private87
prison companies face an incentive structure that encourages efforts
to maintain demand. As Professor David Anderson explains, “[T]o
expand their markets, private prison operators are exhorted to ad-
vance harsh criminal sentencing policies and to dilute early-re-
lease.”  This need to sustain demand, moreover, is not placed in88
impotent hands.  89
85. See supra Part I.C.
86. See HALLINAN, supra note 14, at 177-78; Volokh, supra note 49, at 1218.
87. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
88. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 116.
89. For examples of lobbying efforts, see id. at 127-29.
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The Corrections Corporation of America, for example, draws its
management team from the public sector and has brought former
state prison wardens, superintendents, corrections commissioners,
and one former head of the Federal Bureau of Prisons into the fold.90
This revolving door phenomenon exists in a number of industries
but has the potential to become particularly insidious in the delicate
arena of corrections and sentencing in which individual liberty is at
stake. Although the connection of prison industry stakeholders to
policymakers with a capacity to influence the market does not
equate to the presence of inappropriate conduct, the appearance of
impropriety and the capacity for such influence nevertheless re-
mains. While it appears clear that strong incentives to affect sen-
tencing policy could prove severely troublesome, the strength of this
incentive structure has served as a point of contention in the private
prison literature.  Notably, scholars have challenged the influence91
of the private prison industry on sentencing policy from both
economic and historical perspectives, each of which will be treated
in turn.
In his article on the private prison system, Professor Alexander
Volokh argues there is “virtually no evidence” of proincarceraration
advocacy supported by the private sector.  Volokh points out that92
long before prison privatization took off, actors in the public sector,
such as prison guard unions, actively advocated proincarceration
policies.  Indeed, prison guard unions, which also benefit from in-93
creases in incarceration, contribute vastly more money to political
campaigns and other lobbying efforts than private prison compa-
nies.94
90. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 459. As another illustration of the potential for improper
influence, the wife of Tennessee governor Lamar Alexander invested heavily in Corrections
Corporation of America’s stock before it became involved in the privatization of Tennessee’s
prisons with the support of the governor. See Hart et al., supra note 22, at 1153.
91. See, e.g., Hart et al., supra note 22; Volokh, supra note 49.
92. Volokh, supra note 49, at 1221 (emphasis omitted).
93. See id. at 1197 (“Even without privatization, actors in the public sector already lobby
for changes in substantive law—in the prison context, for example, public corrections officer
unions are active advocates of pro-incarceration policy.”).
94. See A Tale of Two Systems, supra note 43, at 1872-73. Perhaps the most notable
example of such advocacy is the California Correctional Peace Officers Association, which has
contributed money directly to support “three strikes” laws and other stiff sentencing measures
but has often done so under the guise of supporting victims’ rights. See Laura Sullivan,
Folsom Embodies California’s Prison Blues, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.
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Volokh argues that political advocacy is much more likely to be
present in the public sector, given the public sector’s larger share of
the prison market and the alignment of the prison market with the
characteristics of a public good.  Using the economic theory of pub-95
lic goods and collective action to explain the prison market, Volokh
ultimately concludes that the entrance of the private sector into the
market may actually have reduced the industry’s advocacy of incar-
ceration by creating a collective action problem.  As Volokh96
explains, the key characteristic of his economic model is the con-
ceptualization of industry-increasing advocacy as a public good.97
Accordingly, privatizing a segment of the industry “introduces a
collective action problem: unless everyone in the industry cooperates
with each other, they will in aggregate spend less on industry-
increasing advocacy than a single firm would if it covered the whole
industry, because a portion of their expenditures will benefit their
competitors.”  Volokh’s model concludes that the private sector,98
given its small percentage of the market,  will not advocate at all99
for proincarceration policies.  100
Volokh’s model also suggests that increased privatization may
even lead to decreased overall advocacy, reducing it to a certain
threshold he labels an “advocacy-minimizing privatization level.”101
This phenomenon will occur because, as the private sector’s share
of the market rises, the size of the public sector falls, and therefore
the aggregate benefits of incarceration for the public sector fall as
well.  102
npr.org/2009/08/13/111843426/folsom-embodies-californias-prison-blues. To put the strength
of this advocacy in perspective, the California Correctional Peace Officers Association
contributes more to political campaigns than the teachers’ union in California, even though
its work force is one-tenth its size—only the California Medical Association contributes more
each year. THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY 134-35
(Daniel Burton-Rose, Dan Pens & Paul Wright eds., 2002).
95. Volokh, supra note 49, at 1204.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1206.
98. Id. 
99. See id. at 1217-18 (“Of the 1.5 million prisoners under the jurisdiction of federal or
state adult correctional authorities in 2004, 7% were held in private facilities. This includes
14% of federal prisoners and 6% of state prisoners.”). 
100. Id. at 1214-15.
101. Id. at 1215.
102. Id.
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Although these effects are true in theory when assuming a
stagnant market in practice, the private prison industry has
not usurped a portion of the market from the public sector but
rather responded to the demands of an expanding marketplace.103
Accordingly, the public sector has not reduced in size and therefore
has retained the same or greater incentives to lobby. Indeed, this
caveat extends even to the primary conclusion of Volokh’s model
that the private sector can, in essence, act as a free rider and need
not lobby because of its relatively small share of the market. On the
contrary, proincarceration advocacy has an impact at the margins
and, therefore, the relative stake in the public good of increased
incarceration must be evaluated in terms of the relative benefit of
this increase for each sector.  In other words, because the private104
sector holds a greater share of any marginal increase in incarcera-
tion lengths, its incentives to lobby are grounded in that share
rather than the baseline share of the market as a whole. 
In addition to Volokh’s public goods argument, other scholars note
that proponents of the theory that the private prison industry has
a pernicious effect on sentencing fail to take into account the recent
history of penal policy.  In particular, exponential increases in105
incarceration rates occurred long before privatization gained mo-
mentum.  Accordingly, the fundamental point emerges “that gov-106
ernments do not need to be pushed; they jump of their own accord
when it comes to introducing policies which will increase imprison-
ment rates.”  Although this argument perhaps carries more107
practical weight than Volokh’s public goods model, its contextual
strength is lacking just the same. Such an explanation does not
likely translate to future policy decisions in which the political
climate is less supportive of determinate sentencing and policy-
makers, therefore, require a nudge off the ledge. In coming years,
the inevitable trend toward indeterminate sentencing will lead to a
political environment less apt to support costly determinate sen-
103. See generally PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008
(2008), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in
%20100.pdf.
104. See supra Part I.A.
105. HARDING, supra note 55, at 94.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 95.
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tencing measures on its own, thus making private sector lobbying
efforts distressingly more relevant. 
Although the public goods and historical context arguments raise
cautions against overemphasizing the danger of proincarceration
advocacy, neither treat, or even recognize, the alternative mode of
maintaining incarceration rates by affecting sentence lengths of
inmates in private custody. Private prisons can facilitate the im-
position of increased sentences both through the increased assign-
ment of infractions that decrease an inmate’s likelihood of parole
and by maintaining ineffective rehabilitation efforts. As Professor
Dolovich recognizes,
The guard writing up the infraction, and in many cases the
hearing officer as well, will be employed by a corporation with a
direct financial stake—indeed, a paramount interest—in main-
taining a high occupancy rate. This arrangement raises the
concern that official testimony and judgments rendered at D-
hearings will not reflect the treatment that the inmates deserve
or that is consistent with the state’s interest in imposing only
legitimate punishments, but will instead reflect the financial
interests of the company running the prison.108
In this scenario, Volokh’s framework simply does not apply because
the individual inmate’s sentence length is not a public good but a
private good of value only to the company charged with his over-
sight. Thus, strong incentives remain to adversely affect parole
decisions and thereby increase time served.  109
In addition to the perverse incentive to augment the severity of
infractions, private prison companies, to the extent they benefit
from high recidivism rates, have an incentive to “eschew rehabilita-
tion programs.”  Although the public goods model does apply to110
this scenario, the key difference is that it applies here to evaluate
the likelihood of inaction rather than action. Simply put, neglecting
rehabilitation programs requires no affirmative action or capital
108. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 520.
109. See id. at 518-21; Low, supra note 11, at 45 (“Some C.C.A. guards in Tennessee also
say ... they are encouraged to write up prisoners for minor infractions and place them in
segregation. Inmates in ‘seg’ not only lose their good time; they also have thirty days added
to their sentence—a bonus of nearly $1,000 for the company.”).
110. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 120.
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outlay and, therefore, even if the consequent increase in incarcera-
tion rates is a public good divided among those in the prison market,
whatever apportioned benefit results nonetheless carries more
weight than the nonexistent cost. Given the multiple clear paths for
the private prison industry to affect sentences coupled with its
powerful incentives to do so, it seems obtuse to maintain firmly that
the private prison industry has absolutely no influence on sentenc-
ing policy and practice. 
B. The Normatively Problematic Capacity to Influence          
Punishment
Given the largely guarded nature of any lobbying efforts or
unwritten policies affecting sentence lengths, little empirical evi-
dence exists to support either side, and observers are thus reduced
to conjecture based on theory and anecdotal evidence. In this opaque
environment, however, Dolovich’s normative parsimony principle
comes to bear on the analysis. In applying the parsimony principle
—which proscribes “gratuitously long” sentence lengths —Dolovich111
argues that there is a “possible threat to the legitimacy of punish-
ment whenever parties with a financial interest in increased incar-
ceration are in a position to exert influence over the nature and
extent of criminal sentencing.”  In other words, the mere possibil-112
ity of encroachment of financial interests into the realm of punish-
ment is deeply problematic.
Although the prison industry is fundamentally distinct from other
modes of government contracting, an appropriate analogy is the
contracting of private security forces. At the heart of the contro-
versy over private security forces, such as Blackwater Security
Consulting, is the reality that they have the capacity to restrict the
liberty of individuals on the United States’ behalf.  Similarly,113
through incarceration, private prison companies restrict the auto-
nomy of the individual citizen, exercising the state’s most oppressive
power. If this power is to be exercised legitimately in either in-
stance, “it must be consistent with the priority of the most urgent
111. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 515.
112. Id. at 542.
113. See The Real Blackwater Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2010, 7:47 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704065404574636170633783890.html. 
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interests.”  One notable distinction between the two sectors,114
however, is that private security forces have little financial in-
centive to act beyond the scope of the state’s power. Conversely, as
established above,  private prison companies have strong incen-115
tives to do just that. Accordingly, whatever the extent of the actual
effect of the private sector on sentencing, “the state ought not to
foster yet another potentially influential industry that could seek to
compromise further the possibility of legitimate punishment to
promote that industry’s own financial interests.”  In order to116
remedy the violation of the parsimony principle caused by the
encroachment—whether potential or manifest—of financial interest
into the realm of sentencing, commentators invariably propose the
abolishment of the practice of prison privatization.  117
Yet, as was true of the cost-minimization dilemma, the more
pragmatic solution, both politically and practically, is again to re-
formulate the dominant conception of the market.  If the contract-118
ing government body structures the market not for prison beds but
instead for rehabilitated prisoners, it could eliminate and, in fact,
reverse the incentive for private prison companies to advocate for
proincarceration policies and effect longer sentences by influencing
the parole process. When the organizational philosophy  of prison119
companies in turn refocuses on the provision of rehabilitative ser-
vices rather than merely prison beds, the demand for their service
will not be increased by longer sentences. In fact, their service will
be encumbered by unnecessarily long sentences that will only make
releasing an inmate unlikely to recidivate more difficult—in effect,
minimizing output.  Recognition of the misaligned conception of120
the market, both by the state and by the prison industry, is a
significant and difficult step toward reform. However, this recog-
114. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 532.
115. See supra Part III.A.
116. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 542-43.
117. See id. at 543.
118. See supra Part II.E.
119. For a discussion of the importance of organizational philosophy in measuring prison
performance, see GERALD G. GAES ET AL., MEASURING PRISON PERFORMANCE: GOVERNMENT
PRIVATIZATION & ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2004) (“An understanding of prison performance should
begin by deriving goals and objectives from the mission of the prison system.... [P]rison
performance is entirely dependent on one’s expectations about what prisons are supposed to
do.”).
120. See Orsagh & Chen, supra note 81, at 167.
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nition immediately creates the succeeding challenge of reformulat-
ing the market and restructuring the incentives of the prison in-
dustry in order to align with the modified conception of the
market—a challenge to which this Note now turns.
    IV. CONTRACTING FOR PERFORMANCE: REFORMULATING THE 
MARKET THROUGH CONTRACT
Although abandoning the private sector in favor of a return to
public provision of services is a strong option for many of the
reasons discussed above, doing so would ignore the potential of
prison contracts to harness the unique and powerful benefits of
privatization.
A. The Advantages of Outcome-Oriented, Performance-Based
Measurements
Currently struggling to balance their budgets, states continue to
look for ways to minimize the costs of incarceration and the burden
that the focus on incapacitation has imposed in recent decades.121
This need for adaptation lends itself well to the private provision of
services.  By reformulating prison contracts to focus on outcome-122
oriented rather than process-oriented measurements, contracting
agencies can harness the private sector’s capacity to innovate while
reducing costs, responding to the overcrowding crisis, and, most
importantly, assuaging the criticisms of privatization.  Currently,123
the primary mode of contracting for prison services is through a per
diem rate per prisoner.  In order to adapt the market to properly124
characterize the broad service provided, contracts should measure
gains in performance, including effects on recidivism rates and
121. See supra text accompanying note 32.
122. MCGOWAN, supra note 19, at 156-57 (“[C]ontracts put cost-benefit decisions into the
hands of those with a direct stake in running an efficient operation .... Additionally, private
firms often don’t face the same constraints and thus can foster innovations that won’t occur
under government monopoly.” (footnote omitted)).
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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employment trends of former inmates, and reward them accord-
ingly.  125
Some efforts to reform prison contracts to take into consideration
performance-based measures have already been implemented, but
thus far they have focused primarily on process-oriented outcomes
—or “output-driven inputs.”  Beginning to recognize the impact of126
incarceration on one’s capacity to reenter society, some states have
started to require the provision of vocational services in an attempt
to respond to the extensive empirical findings that vocational
training has a positive effect on an inmate’s ability to reenter society
successfully.  Unfortunately, even with the inclusion of vocational127
training requirements, the fundamental incentive structure remains
geared toward minimizing variable costs and the organizational
philosophy remains focused on incapacitation.  Although output-128
driven inputs are designed as proxies for outputs, “the precise man-
ner in which these inputs are made is a decision for the contractor,
and in this sense the fundamental dichotomy remains intact.”  As129
a result, while output-driven inputs are important measurements,
they cannot adequately supplant the use of output measurements.
In order to capture fully the benefits of the private sector and
facilitate the shift from incapacitation to rehabilitation, contracting
agencies must utilize direct measures of outcomes in addition to the
process-oriented and output-driven input measurement tools al-
ready used. 
B. Graduated Bonus System
One possible mode of formulating such a contract is a graduated
bonus system that compensates private prison companies for de-
125. Contracting agencies could measure employment through a number of means, but
coordinating with the parole system would likely prove easiest.
126. See supra note 55.
127. See, e.g., Kerry L. Pyle, Note, Prison Employment: A Long-Term Solution to the
Overcrowding Crisis, 77 B.U. L. REV. 151 (1997).
128. See Judith Greene, Comparing Private and Public Prison Services and Programs in
Minnesota: Findings from Prisoner Interviews, 11 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 202, 226 (1999)
(“Participation in education and vocational classes is more likely to be full-time in the public
prisons. The public programs are fully licensed, the instructors are more likely to have proper
credentials.”). But see McDonald & Patten, supra note 13, at 95. 
129. HARDING, supra note 55, at 68.
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creases in the recidivism rate or increases in the employment rate
of inmates who have reentered society. Given the high cost of incar-
ceration, even a fraction of such cost savings offered as a bonus for
each inmate statistically expected to recidivate who did not do so
would represent a significant incentive to the private industry as it
would carry no post-release responsibility. 
An important criticism of weighing output measures too heavily
is the volatility and myriad of factors that contribute to these
rates.  Appropriately rewarding the value added by the private130
prison company, indeed, is the most important challenge, but a
number of measures can be taken that would minimize the risk of
unjust deserts.  First, a graduated bonus that increased as the131
particular prison’s employment and recidivism rates deviated
further and further from the mean would reduce the likelihood that
private companies would receive an undeserved windfall—the
farther in standard deviations from the mean the private prison is,
the more likely a causal relationship that should be rewarded exists. 
Second, in light of the reality that many other factors, such as
age, prior criminal history, and sex, impact the likelihood of recid-
ivism, the contracting agency could control for these variables when
measuring the performance of the prison. Controlling for these
factors would also respond effectively to the potential attempts by
both the contractor and contracting agency to cherry-pick inmates
least likely to recidivate.  Although measuring outputs in this132
manner would require additional administrative costs, these costs
would be significantly reduced by the contracting agency’s ready
access to such information.  133
Third, the criticism that recidivism ignores the distinction be-
tween criminality and conviction  can be mitigated by the use of134
130. See id. (“[T]he human variables are too volatile for any contractor to be expected to
stand or fall by outputs alone, so ‘output-driven inputs’ replace or supplement them.”)
131. That would also respond to the problems of measuring recidivism outlined by Michael
Maltz. See MICHAEL MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 18-26 (1984).
132. Private prisons have already been accused of “cherry-picking” prisoners who will cost
the least to house—for example, those without health issues, or nonviolent offenders. See
MCGOWAN, supra note 19, at 166.
133. Indeed, contracting agencies would have ready access to information regarding
reoffending inmates and could use tax returns, self-reporting, and, most usefully, the parole
system to monitor employment. 
134. See GAES ET AL., supra note 119, at 21 (discussing the distinction between criminality
and crime). 
2013] CONTRACTING FOR PERFORMANCE 2113
employment information  and by adjusting for statewide changes135
in crime rates.  136
These measures, of course, represent only a platform on which to
build rather than a comprehensive plan for restructuring prison
contracts. The struggle to create efficient measurement tools while
maintaining the requisite incentives to induce prison companies to
invest in inmates’ future capacity to reintegrate will undoubtedly
prove challenging and require delicate calibration. The effort, how-
ever, is unquestionably worthy of investment as the benefits of
success are diverse and compounding.  137
CONCLUSION
The graduated bonus system, of course, represents only one
possible mode of effecting a larger reformulation of the market that
aligns with the theoretical framework developed above. The bonus
system, however, clearly illustrates the heretofore unrecognized
capacity of the private sector, when faced with the proper incen-
tives, to overcome the cost-minimization and incarceration advocacy
challenges of privatization. The bonus system also has the capac-
ity to play an important role in the larger shift of corrections away
from incapacitation to a renewed emphasis on rehabilitation.
Fortunately, this reformulation of the market also works in favor of
private prison companies, whose profit margins under the tradi-
tional structure will likely be threatened in the coming years as
135. See Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A
Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 529 (2000) (finding
that those offenders who are employed are less likely to engage in criminal behavior). 
136. By controlling for fluctuations in crime rate, the contracting agency could ensure that
the gap between criminality and crime does not provide a windfall after, for example, a
reduction in policing efforts.
137. See GAES ET AL., supra note 119, at 6 (“[W]e should hold criminal justice agencies
responsible for their contribution to providing incentives and skills to inmates who will then
have a better opportunity to make law-abiding decisions upon release from prison. We
certainly recognize the importance of other determinants of offending that are typically
beyond the control of criminal justice agencies: early childhood influences, the macro social
and economic environment, the conditions and norms in neighborhoods. These external
factors do not diminish the responsibility of our criminal justice agencies to bring about
socially desirable changes in individuals.”).
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incarceration rates fall.  This benefit, if recognized by the private138
sector, is perhaps the greatest harbinger of the potential success of
utilizing the private market to help restructure the operational
philosophy of the corrections system. Another critical gauge of the
potential viability of the paradigm shift proposed is its political
tractability in the current climate. With regard to corrections policy,
political tractability represents the end game. No matter how logical
or sound, a particular proposal grounded in purely normative terms
will inexorably fall on deaf ears.  The theoretical and practical139
framework this Note has developed, however, is appropriately pre-
sented as a cost-savings measure that would take advantage of the
unique benefits of privatization while addressing the long-held con-
cerns of opponents to prison privatization, thus proving amenable
to a broad spectrum of political interests. Although much work
remains, the mutually beneficial nature of the proposed reformula-
tion of prison contracts and the paradigmatic conception of the
prison market serves as a strong basis for the investment of energy
in years to come.
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